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This paper addresses conflicting results regarding the optimal taxation of capital income. Judd (1985)
proves that in steady state there should be no taxation of capital income. Lansing (1999) studies a logarithmic
example of one of Judd’s models and finds that the optimal steady state tax on capital income is not always
zero – it is positive in some specifications, negative in some others. There appears to be a contradiction.
However, I show that Lansing derives his result by relaxing the convergence hypotheses of Judd’s theorem.
With less restrictive hypotheses, a wider range of primitives (parameter values, initial condition, etc) satisfy
the hypotheses and since each specification of primitives generates its own optimal time path(s) for the
model’s variables, it follows that a wider range of time paths with a wider range of steady state properties is
possible. This raises a question. What happens if the convergence hypotheses are weakened further so that
they are satisfied by a wider yet range of primitives? I find that at any interior steady state for the model’s
optimal tax equilibrium, either the capital tax is zero or else the elasticity of marginal utility is unitary
which is satisfied identically in Lansing’s log example. In effect, Lansing’s example illustrates the only way
in which an interior steady state can violate the zero tax result.
JEL Classification: H2
Keywords: dynamic optimal taxation
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1 Introduction
Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) prove that capital income should not be taxed in a steady state. Lans-
ing (1999) provides a counterexample to this result. The example is particularly intriguing since it is a special
case of one of Judd’s models. There appears to be a contradiction. Lansing offers explanations to reconcile
the differences. He also considers extensions of the model that revive the zero tax result. However, one is
still left wondering what goes wrong in the counterexample. Lansing states on page 449, “Future research
should be directed at developing a solution method that gives the right answer in all cases.” Judd’s solution
method is optimal control theory (as is Lansing’s). It would be very troubling indeed if optimal control
theory failed to give the right answer. Fortunately, the contradiction can be resolved: Judd and Lansing
have proved two different theorems with two different sets of hypotheses. For the special case considered by
Lansing in which the “capitalist”has logarithmic utility, his theorem’s hypotheses are less restrictive than
Judd’s so the range of primitives (parameter values, initial condition, “worker’s”utility function, production
function) that satisfy his hypotheses is wider. Since each specification of the primitives generates its own
optimal time path(s) for the model’s variables,1 Lansing’s less restrictive hypotheses allow for a wider range
of time paths with a wider range of steady state characteristics. In particular, convergence to a zero capital
tax is one possible characteristic, but not the only one.
The hypotheses in question deal with the convergence properties of various co-state variables (Lagrange
multipliers). Kemp, Long, and Shimomura (1993) have also observed that the convergence hypotheses of
Judd’s theorem might not be satisfied. Among the possibilities is that the steady state of the dynamical
system could be completely unstable in which case the zero capital tax result may not apply. In Lansing’s
log example it turns out there is a somewhat different reason why Judd’s convergence hypotheses might
not be satisfied. The issue is not the local dynamics about the dynamical system’s steady state, but rather
the very existence of a steady state. Further work regarding the convergence properties has been done by
Straub and Werning (2018). They state, “Reinhorn . . . correctly clarified that in the logarithmic case the
Lagrange multipliers explode, explaining the difference in results”between Judd (1985) and Lansing (1999).
Straub and Werning (2018) also state, “[W]e believe the issue can be framed exactly as Reinhorn . . . did,
emphasizing the non convergence of multipliers.”
A main reason why it is diffi cult to characterize steady states in Judd’s optimal tax model is because
an explicit solution for the economy’s optimal time path(s) is generally not possible. If we had an explicit
solution for every possible specification of the primitives, it would be relatively straightforward to identify
which primitives generate paths that satisfy the convergence hypotheses and in these cases to identify the
limiting tax rate. But this is generally not possible, so the few cases that do admit an explicit solution
1For given primitives, the solution to the optimal tax problem might not be unique hence there might be multiple optimal
time paths.
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are valuable study tools. Example 3.5 presents such a case, one in which the optimal tax equilibrium is
time invariant: the tax rate, capital stock, and consumption levels stay forever at their time 0 values.
The example has a non-zero optimal capital tax. It satisfies all hypotheses of Lansing’s theorem and in
particular in Lansing’s formulation of the problem the co-state/multiplier is time invariant. However, in
Judd’s formulation of the problem (which is the exact same optimal tax problem but a different formulation
with different co-states), the co-states explode linearly to ±∞ in the infinite future, a violation of Judd’s
convergence hypotheses. So Judd’s theorem does not apply and this explains how it is possible to have an
optimal tax equilibrium that violates Judd’s conclusion of a zero capital tax in the limit. It also suggests
the need for theorems that do not make assumptions about the behavior of co-state variables.
More specifically, since the co-state variables are unobservable shadow prices that are not part of the
economy’s equilibrium (and they do not appear in the statement of the optimal taxation problem), one
would rather not make assumptions about their behavior. On the other hand, it is quite reasonable to
assume that observable macroeconomic variables have stable long run behavior since this is consistent with
most developed economies. (E.g., page 304 of Lucas 1990 for the US.) In the case of Judd’s model, which
abstracts from demographics and technological change, stability boils down to convergence to an interior
steady state. Thus, in theorem 3.6 I study the behavior of the optimal tax on capital income, assuming
only that the observable macro variables converge to positive limits, with no assumptions about co-states.2
I find that the following must hold: either the modified golden rule is satisfied in the limit or else savings
are insensitive to the after-tax interest rate in the limit. In the former case we get Judd’s zero tax result. In
the latter case, the income and substitution effects of an interest rate change just cancel, and this is what
occurs in Lansing’s example with logarithmic utility. If interest does not affect savings, this undermines the
benefit from a zero tax on interest/capital income and suggests why Judd’s result does not necessarily hold
in this case.
Straub and Werning (2018) raise serious concerns about Judd’s convergence hypotheses in the case
where the capitalist in the model has utility with a constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS).
In particular, when the capitalist’s EIS is less than one, the solution to the optimal tax problem cannot
converge to an interior steady state. If, in addition, the social welfare function places zero weight on the
capitalist and all weight on the worker, then the solution to the optimal tax problem does converge, but to
a non-interior steady state with a positive tax rate on capital income. Straub and Werning (2018) conclude
that Judd’s model cannot be used to unequivocally justify a zero long run tax on capital income. I agree
with Straub and Werning (2018). But since the constant EIS case with elasticity less than one leads to a
2Throughout the paper, the theorems’hypotheses will be stated in terms of the convergence of endogenous variables. The
theorems do not characterize the primitives that satisfy convergence. Some primitives will satisfy Judd’s hypotheses, some will
satisfy Lansing’s, and some neither. However, as discussed above, it seems reasonable to focus on those primitives that lead
to stable long run behavior and to reject those that lead to unstable long run behavior (or that lead to corners) since this is
inconsistent with the macroeconomic facts.
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non-interior steady state, and since this is inconsistent with stable long run behavior, I prefer to exclude
these utility functions from consideration and instead focus on utility functions (and other primitives) that
do lead to stable long run behavior.
In hindsight, it may seem clear that if Judd finds that the optimal tax rate must converge to zero, while
Lansing finds that it might converge to zero (part (ii) of Lansing’s proposition 2) but might instead converge
to a non-zero limit (parts (i) and (iii)), then Lansing must have relaxed Judd’s hypotheses. However, there
is another possible explanation, one that is incorrect: in the log case that Lansing considers, Judd’s analysis
might break down and give the wrong solution to the optimal tax problem. On page 423 Lansing states,
“I show that the standard approach [Judd’s] to solving the dynamic optimal tax problem yields the wrong
answer in this (knife-edge) case [log] because it fails to properly enforce the constraints associated with the
competitive equilibrium.” On page 438 he adds, “When applying the standard approach in Judd’s model,
the allocations for k [capital] and c [capitalist’s consumption] are assumed to be independent for all [values of
the capitalist’s constant EIS]. However, as [the EIS converges to 1], this assumption breaks down because the
competitive equilibrium requires c = ρk [where ρ is a preference parameter]. By continuing to treat k and c as
independent, the standard approach actually lets in an additional policy instrument through the back door.”
The error here is the statement that the standard approach treats k and c as independent in the log case;
in fact, the standard/Judd approach actually fully accounts for the restriction c = ρk. In particular, Judd’s
approach constrains the optimal tax problem to satisfy two differential equations, the capitalist’s consumption
Euler equation and the equilibrium capital accumulation equation, as well as two boundary conditions. I
show below that under log utility, these constraints necessarily imply the restriction c = ρk; hence, when
these constraints are imposed on the problem then so too is the restriction c = ρk. Pontryagin’s theorem
then ensures that the necessary conditions for optimality fully reflect this restriction. Appendix D provides a
careful derivation of the necessary conditions and confirms the validity of Judd’s approach. Furthermore, and
crucially, lemma 3.2 below proves that in the log case Judd’s approach is completely equivalent to Lansing’s
– their first order conditions are mathematically equivalent: any solution to Judd’s is also a solution to
Lansing’s and vice versa.3 Judd’s analysis is correct and so is Lansing’s. The differences in their conclusions
follow from the differences in their hypotheses.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents the theorems of Judd and Lansing, explains the rela-
3With regard to Lansing’s “back door” statement, he correctly shows that in the log case Judd’s steady state equations
imply equality of the welfare-weighted marginal utilities of the model’s two consumers (Lansing’s equation (25) on page 438).
This is a first best condition but it does not imply the implicit existence of some additional policy instrument. If it did, then
Lansing’s own back door is just as open as Judd’s: this exact same condition (25) appears in part (ii) of Lansing’s proposition 2.
If Judd’s result in the log case implicitly uses an additional policy instrument then so too does Lansing’s result in part (ii).
But in fact neither of them does so. Rather, in the log case Judd’s convergence hypotheses are so demanding that generically
they cannot be satisfied. See the discussion following equation (4) below. So Lansing’s (25) does not indicate the implicit
presence of an additional policy instrument; it indicates a fluke. Analogously, under particular conditions the entire first-best
time path that maximizes the government’s social welfare can be decentralized as an equilibrium, and without any additional
policy instruments. See appendix B below. But this too would be a fluke.
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tionship between these two theorems, and also provides the general result described above. Section 4 offers
a concluding comment.
2 Model
The model has four economic actors: capitalist, worker, firm, government. The capitalist has access to the
capital market but does no work. The worker supplies labor inelastically but has no access to the capital
market. The firm is a price taking profit maximizer that uses capital and labor to produce output. The
government chooses a time path for the tax rate on capital income and uses the proceeds to provide lump
sum transfers to the worker. There is no government debt. Hence the transfers must equal the taxes at each
point in time. We now proceed to describe the model in detail.
The capitalist has an infinite horizon and maximizes discounted utility,
∫∞
0
e−ρtu(cct)dt, where ρ > 0
is the subjective discount rate and cct ≥ 0 is instantaneous consumption. The superscript identifies the
capitalist; cwt will be the worker’s consumption. The instantaneous utility function u is smooth, strictly
increasing, strictly concave, and satisfies Inada conditions. At the beginning of time the capitalist’s wealth
consists of the economy’s entire stock of capital, k0 > 0. This stock of wealth/capital evolves through time
according to the capital accumulation equation: k̇t = (1 − τkt)(rt − δ)kt − cct where τkt is the tax rate on
net capital income (subsidy rate if negative), rt is the pre-tax interest rate gross of depreciation, and δ is the
depreciation rate. Note the lack of wage income which reflects the assumption that the capitalist supplies no
labor. For ease of notation, let r̄t := (1− τkt)(rt − δ) denote the after tax, net of depreciation, interest rate.
Then the capital accumulation equation is k̇t = r̄tkt−cct . Let R̄t :=
∫ t
0
r̄sds be the cumulative interest factor.




When T →∞ this equation gives the capitalist’s lifetime budget. In order to prevent Ponzi schemes we will
require that the present value of wealth be non-negative in the limit: limT→∞ e−R̄T kT ≥ 0. Then the lifetime
present value budget constraint is
∫∞
0
e−R̄tcctdt ≤ k0. The capitalist maximizes lifetime utility subject to
this budget.4 At the solution, the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution must equal the ratio of present






e−R̄tcctdt = k0. (1)
Equivalently, the first of these conditions can be log differentiated to give the capitalist’s consumption Euler
equation ċctu
′′(cct)/u
′(cct) = ρ − r̄t. The second equation in (1) can be expressed in its no-Ponzi form as
limt→∞ e
−R̄tkt = 0, or, by the first equation in (1), limt→∞ e−ρtu′(cct)kt = 0.
The worker inelastically supplies a flow of one unit of labor and immediately consumes all wages and
transfers due to the lack of access to the capital market. So the worker is a passive actor who makes
4Throughout, control variables in optimization problems are required to be piecewise continuous functions of t. This includes
r̄t since it is the control for the optimal taxation problem in section 3 below.
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no decisions. The instantaneous utility function is v(cwt ). The worker’s consumption (and income) is c
w
t =
wt+TRt where wt is the wage and TRt is the transfer. The assumptions that were imposed on the capitalist’s
utility function u are also imposed on v.
The firm is a price taking profit maximizer with constant returns to scale in labor and capital. The
production function in intensive form is f(kt). The capital to labor ratio coincides with the capital stock since
the labor supply is always one unit. We assume that f(0) = 0 and that f also satisfies the same conditions
as the utility functions u and v. At an interior optimum for the firm, f ′(kt) = rt and f(kt)− ktf ′(kt) = wt.
Given the restriction against government debt, tax revenue must equal the transfer at each instant:
τkt(rt − δ)kt = TRt. Hence, from the definition of r̄t and the firm’s profit maximization condition, TRt =
−r̄tkt + [f ′(kt)− δ]kt. Then the worker’s consumption is
cwt = wt + TRt = [f(kt)− ktf ′(kt)]− r̄tkt + [f ′(kt)− δ]kt = f(kt)− δkt − r̄tkt. (2)
In equilibrium, consumption plus investment must equal output: cct + c
w
t + δkt + k̇t = f(kt). Substitute
for cwt to get k̇t = r̄tkt − cct , which is satisfied by the capitalist’s flow budget constraint (Walras’Law).
3 Optimal taxation
The government maximizes social welfare
∫∞
0
e−ρt[γv(cwt ) + (1− γ)u(cct)]dt subject to the equilibrium con-
ditions: the capitalist maximizes lifetime utility, the worker consumes all available income, firms maximize
profits, the government’s budget is in balance at every instant so the worker’s income is as described in (2),
and markets clear. Note that the government applies the capitalist’s discount factor to both consumers, and
the welfare weight γ is time invariant. There is one further constraint: r̄t ≥ 0. This is a policy restriction
that prevents the government from imposing a tax rate in excess of 100 percent.5 And there are two further
assumptions implicit in the analysis of Judd (1985):
• The initial stock of capital satisfies f(k0) − δk0 > 0. Without this, the worker’s initial consumption
in (2) would not be positive.
• The policy r̄t ≡ 0 does not solve the optimal taxation problem. This requires some background. In
nonlinear programming the Fritz John necessary conditions allow for the possibility that the Lagrange
multiplier of the objective function equals zero. But if a constraint qualification is satisfied this La-
grange multiplier can be set equal to one and we get the Kuhn—Tucker necessary conditions. For
5Judd (1985) and Lansing (1999) both impose r̄t ≥ 0. If it were not imposed, the government could set an arbitrarily high
tax rate on capital income for an arbitrarily short period of time and thereby raise tax revenue with almost no distortion.
However, since the government must balance its budget at each instant of time, the benefits from this brief tax haul would be
fleeting. By contrast, if the government were allowed to run a budget surplus then the tax revenue from the haul could be saved
and gradually drawn down to pay for transfers to the worker. So the degree of importance of the constraint r̄t ≥ 0 depends on
the nature of the government’s budget constraint. For the sake of consistency with Judd (1985) and Lansing (1999), r̄t ≥ 0 is
imposed here.
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optimal control we follow Seierstad and Sydsæter (1987, p. 86) and say that a solution to the Pontrya-
gin necessary conditions is abnormal if the multiplier of the objective function equals zero. For the
optimal taxation problem here, appendix D shows that the only abnormal solution is r̄t ≡ 0. Under the
assumption that this does not solve the optimal taxation problem, then any time path that is optimal
must be a normal solution. I.e., the multiplier of the objective function is not zero, and it can be set
equal to one by normalization, as we do below.
One may feel uncomfortable with the assumption that r̄t ≡ 0 is not optimal. It would be better not to
impose an assumption on an endogenous policy variable. Appendix E provides two assumptions on the
model’s primitives under which we can prove that r̄t ≡ 0 is not optimal. Unfortunately the derivation
is quite tedious.




e−ρt[γv(f(kt)− δkt − r̄tkt) + (1− γ)u(cct)]dt
subject to k̇t = r̄tkt − cct
ċct = (ρ− r̄t)u′(cct)/u′′(cct)
r̄t ≥ 0
with k0 > 0 given and limt→∞ e−ρtu′(cct)kt = 0. The optimal time path for the tax rate can be recovered
from the definition of r̄t := (1− τkt)(rt − δ) with rt = f ′(kt). The current value Hamiltonian is
H(k, cc, r̄, q1, q2, η) = γv
(
f(k)− δk − r̄k
)
+ (1− γ)u(cc) + q1(r̄k − cc) + q2(ρ− r̄)u′(cc)/u′′(cc) + ηr̄ .
The state variables are kt (with co-state q1t) and cct (with co-state q2t), r̄t is the control, and ηt is the
Lagrange multiplier for the constraint r̄t ≥ 0. The following conditions are necessary for optimality:6
∂H/∂k = γv′(cwt )[f
′(kt)− δ − r̄t] + q1tr̄t = ρq1t − q̇1t (3a)




= ρq2t − q̇2t (3b)
∂H/∂r̄ = −γv′(cwt )kt + q1tkt − q2tu′(cct)/u′′(cct) + ηt = 0 (3c)
∂H/∂q1 = r̄tkt − cct = k̇t (3d)
∂H/∂q2 = (ρ− r̄t)u′(cct)/u′′(cct) = ċct (3e)
ηt ≥ 0, r̄t ≥ 0, ηtr̄t = 0, q20 = 0 (3f)
6Note that the co-states do not appear in the equilibrium conditions nor in the statement of the optimal taxation problem.
They are introduced in the Hamiltonian to allow for the use of optimal control theory and thereby derive necessary conditions
for optimality. This should be kept in mind with regard to Judd’s (1985) theorem and Lansing’s (1999) theorem.
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together with the problem’s two boundary conditions. The last line includes the complementary slackness
and transversality conditions.7
3.1 Theorem (Judd)8 Suppose a solution to (3) has the property that kt, cct , r̄t, and q1t converge as t tends
to infinity, with strictly positive limits for kt, cct , and c
w
t . Then limt→∞ τkt = 0.
Proof Drop the time subscripts to denote limiting values. From (3e),9 r̄ = ρ. Therefore (3a) yields
f ′(k)− δ − r̄ = 0. The theorem now follows from the definition r̄t = (1− τkt)[f ′(kt)− δ].
In Lansing’s example, u = log. Then (3e) yields cct = c
c
0e
R̄t−ρt, and (3d) yields d[e−R̄tkt]/dt = −e−R̄tcct .
Substitute the former into the latter to get d[e−R̄tkt]/dt = d[cc0e
−ρt/ρ]/dt and hence e−R̄tkt = constant +
cc0e
−ρt/ρ or equivalently kt = constant · eR̄t + cc0eR̄t−ρt/ρ. Now substitute this expression for kt and the
previous expression for cct into the boundary condition limt→∞ e
−ρtu′(cct)kt = 0 with u = log. This determines
that the “constant”must be zero, so kt = cc0e
R̄t−ρt/ρ. Evaluate at t = 0 and use R̄0 = 0 to get the capitalist’s
initial consumption, cc0 = ρk0. Thus, c
c
t = ρk0e
R̄t−ρt and kt = k0eR̄t−ρt from which we conclude cct = ρkt.
Substitute this and u = log into (3) to get:
∂H/∂k = γv′(cwt )[f
′(kt)− δ − r̄t] + q1tr̄t = ρq1t − q̇1t (4a)
∂H/∂cc = (1− γ)/(ρkt)− q1t − q2t(ρ− r̄t) = ρq2t − q̇2t (4b)
∂H/∂r̄ = −γv′(cwt )kt + q1tkt + q2tρkt + ηt = 0 (4c)
∂H/∂q1 = r̄tkt − ρkt = k̇t (4d)
∂H/∂q2 = −(ρ− r̄t)ρkt = ρk̇t (4e)
ηt ≥ 0, r̄t ≥ 0, ηtr̄t = 0, q20 = 0. (4f)
This system characterizes the solution to the optimal tax problem when u = log. One of the properties
of (4) is that generically limt→∞(kt, cct , r̄t, q1t) does not exist. I.e., it may be that some of these variables
7Appendix D provides a derivation of these necessary conditions. For a finite time horizon T , the transversality conditions
would be q20 = q2T = 0. With an infinite time horizon, q20 = 0 continues to be necessary for optimality and this has
implications for the time (in)consistency of the solution. Regarding the necessity of the transversality condition at infinity
(TVC∞) for continuous time models, see Halkin (1974) for an early treatment. Kamihigashi (2001) generalizes much of the
previous literature on this topic. However, Kamihigashi’s (2001) results are not applicable to the optimal taxation problem
here. In particular, if we express the problem here in reduced form, the constraint set for (kt, cct , k̇t, ċ
c
t ) has an empty interior,
and this violates assumption 3.1 of Kamihigashi (2001). The TVC∞ may still be necessary for optimality, but we cannot
use Kamihigashi’s (2001) theorem to reach this conclusion. Fortunately this has no bearing on the main results here. Judd’s
theorem, Lansing’s theorem, and theorem 3.6 below remain true whether or not the TVC∞ is included among the necessary
conditions.
8See theorem 2 and equations (24) on page 72 of Judd (1985).
9The assumption that limt→∞ ξt converges does not always imply limt→∞ ξ̇t = 0 (e.g., t
−1 sin t2). However, this is not a
problem here. Equations (3a, (3d), (3e) are of the form ξ̇t = G(kt, c
c
t , r̄t, q1t) with G continuous, where ξ̇t represents q̇1t, k̇t,
or ċct . Therefore, under stated assumptions, ξ̇t has a limit as t tends to infinity. That limit must be zero; otherwise ξt (no
dot) would fail to converge as t tends to infinity. A similar argument can be applied to Lansing’s theorem, and to parts of
theorem 3.6, below.
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converge, but in general they cannot all converge. Thus, for this special utility function the hypotheses
of Judd’s theorem generically cannot be satisfied. The reason is as follows. If all these variables were to
converge, the proof of Judd’s theorem would apply so in the limit r̄ = ρ (hence η = 0) and f ′(k) = δ+ρ. The
latter condition would uniquely determine k (modified golden rule). Then, from (4c), q2t would converge
and its limit would satisfy γv′(cw) = q1 + ρq2. Also, in the limit, (4b) would yield (1− γ)/(ρk) = q1 + ρq2.
Hence (1 − γ)/(ρk) = γv′(cw) = γv′
(
f(k) − δk − ρk
)
, where the last equality uses (2). This would impose
a second condition on k, in addition to f ′(k) = δ + ρ. Only in exceptional cases will the same value of k
satisfy both these conditions. Generically there will be no k that satisfies both. Nonetheless, (4) is still valid
– it still characterizes the solution to the optimal tax problem when u = log. The fact that (generically)
its variables do not all converge is neither here nor there.







f(kt)− δkt − r̄tkt
)
+ (1− γ) log(ρkt)]dt
subject to k̇t = (r̄t − ρ)kt
r̄t ≥ 0
with k0 > 0 given. The ċct equation is dropped because it is redundant. Thus the k̇t equation has a dual role.
Not only is it the capital accumulation equation; it is also the consumption Euler equation for the capitalist.




+ (1− γ) log(ρk) + q3(r̄− ρ)k+ ηr̄. The
following conditions are necessary for optimality:
∂H/∂k = γv′(cwt )[f
′(kt)− δ − r̄t] + (1− γ)/kt + q3t(r̄t − ρ) = ρq3t − q̇3t (5a)
∂H/∂r̄ = −γv′(cwt )kt + q3tkt + ηt = 0 (5b)
∂H/∂q3 = (r̄t − ρ)kt = k̇t (5c)
ηt ≥ 0, r̄t ≥ 0, ηtr̄t = 0 (5d)
with k0 > 0 given. In Lansing (1999), this appears as (21) on page 435. Note the new notation q3t for the
co-state here in (5). Since the k̇t equation has a dual role here so does its co-state.10 Indeed q3t is distinct
from both of the co-states in (4), q1t (for capital) and q2t (for the capitalist’s consumption). However, they
are related to one another.
10Cf Lansing (1999) where the same notation q1t is used for the dual role co-state in (21) on page 435 and also for capital’s
co-state in (17) on page 432 where utility is not restricted to be logarithmic.
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3.2 Lemma Let u = log. Equations (4) and (5) are equivalent, with
q3t = q1t + ρq2t (6)








Proof First, given a solution to (4), verify that (5) is satisfied when q3t is defined by (6). From (4a),
γv′(cwt )[f
′(kt)− δ − r̄t] = (ρ− r̄t)q1t − q̇1t
= (ρ− r̄t)(q3t − ρq2t)− (q̇3t − ρq̇2t) by definition of q3t
= (ρ− r̄t)q3t − q̇3t − (1− γ)/kt + ρq1t + ρ2q2t by (4b)
= (ρ− r̄t)q3t − q̇3t − (1− γ)/kt + ρq3t by definition of q3t.
So (5a) is satisfied. Clearly (5b) follows from (4c), (5c) follows from (4d), and (5d) follows from (4f). This
completes the verification of (5).
Next, given a solution to (5), verify that (4) is satisfied when q1t and q2t are defined by (7) and (8). Take
the time derivative of (7):
k̇tq1t + ktq̇1t = 1− γ + k̇tq3t + ktq̇3t − ρktq3t.
Substitute for k̇t from (5c) and substitute for q̇3t from (5a):
(r̄t − ρ)ktq1t + ktq̇1t
= 1− γ + (r̄t − ρ)ktq3t + kt {−γv′(cwt )[f ′(kt)− δ − r̄t]− (1− γ)/kt − q3t(r̄t − ρ) + ρq3t} − ρktq3t.
Simplify and divide by kt > 0 to get (4a). Take the time derivative of (8):
k̇tq2t + ktq̇2t = −(1− γ)/ρ+ ktq3t.
Substitute for k̇t from (5c). We can also substitute for ktq3t: take (7) and add to it ρ times (8) to get
ktq1t + ρktq2t = ktq3t. After these substitutions we have
(r̄t − ρ)ktq2t + ktq̇2t = −(1− γ)/ρ+ ktq1t + ρktq2t.
Divide by kt > 0 to get (4b). Since we have just shown that (7) and (8) yield ktq1t + ρktq2t = ktq3t,
(4c) follows from (5b). Clearly, (4d) and (4e) follow from (5c). Finally, (4f) follows from (5d) and (8). In
particular, (8) yields q20 = 0.11
11With u = log, the lemma’s equivalence result has the following consequence. In (4), q1t and q2t affect the real allocation
only through the value of q1t + ρq2t. Hence, at any time t > 0 we can reset the value of q2t to zero and reset the value of q1t to
11
3.3 Theorem (Lansing)12 Let u = log. Suppose a solution to (5) has the property that kt, r̄t, and q3t
converge as t tends to infinity, with strictly positive limits for kt, cwt , and f
′(kt) − δ. Then, dropping the
time subscripts to denote limiting values, sgn(τk) = sgn
(
ργv′(cw)k − 1 + γ
)
.
Proof From (5c), r̄ = ρ. From (5b), q3 = γv′(cw) since η = 0 (r̄ > 0) and k > 0. Therefore, (5a) yields
γv′(cw)[f ′(k)− δ − r̄] = ργv′(cw)− (1− γ)/k. The theorem now follows from r̄t = (1− τkt)[f ′(kt)− δ].
When u = log, Judd’s hypotheses are more restrictive than Lansing’s. That is, in (4) Judd’s hypotheses
are that kt, cct , r̄t, and q1t all converge. Recall that generically this does not happen, but when it does,
(1− γ)/(ρk) = γv′(cw). So in this special case Lansing’s theorem yields τk = 0 in the limit, just like Judd’s
theorem: When u = log, Judd’s theorem is a special (and exceptional) case of Lansing’s.
Furthermore, when Judd’s hypotheses are satisfied, q2t also converges by (4c). Hence, by (6), q3t con-
verges in (5). So Lansing’s hypotheses are satisfied. I.e., when u = log Judd’s hypotheses imply Lansing’s
hypotheses. The converse does not necessarily hold. It is possible for q3t to converge while q1t and q2t
diverge. The following corollary states this formally.
3.4 Corollary Let u = log. Suppose a solution to (5) has the property that kt, r̄t, and q3t converge as t
tends to infinity, with strictly positive limits for kt, cwt , and f
′(kt)− δ. Then, in (4),
lim
t→∞







/k = −(1− γ)/(ρk) + γv′(cw)
where k = limt→∞ kt, etc. So if ργv′(cw)k 6= 1− γ then both q1t and q2t fail to converge.
Remark With u = log, theorem 3.3 yields sgn(τk) = sgn
(
ργv′(cw)k− 1 + γ
)
. It follows that if τk 6= 0 then
ργv′(cw)k 6= 1− γ in which case the corollary tells us that q1t fails to converge and hence the hypotheses of
Judd’s theorem 3.1 are not satisfied. That is, if the capital tax result from Judd’s theorem is violated, then
the hypotheses from Judd’s theorem must have been violated.
Proof In (7) and (8), apply l’Hopital’s rule to the integrals divided by t, and use q3 = γv′(cw) from the
proof of theorem 3.3.
The following example rigs the initial condition and parameter values to illustrate the corollary.
lims↑t(q1s + ρq2s). Thereafter, the future evolution of q1 follows (4a) and q2 follows (4b) and so the future values of q1 + ρq2
are exactly as they were before the change. This has no effect on the real allocation. The ability to reset q2t to zero at any
point in time, without real consequence, tells us the optimal taxation problem is dynamically consistent when u = log.
12See proposition 2 on page 435 of Lansing (1999). In the statement of theorem 3.3 here, the hypothesis that q3t converges
is actually a consequence of the other hypotheses, but it is stated explicitly for consistency; see the first line of the proof on
page 435 of Lansing (1999). Appendix C below shows that Lansing’s (1999) theorem can be derived directly from Judd’s (1985)
optimality conditions, i.e., directly from (3) with u = log. For some intuition regarding the theorem’s result, since u = log and
cc = ρk, the result can be expressed as sgn(τk) = sgn
(
γv′(cw) − (1 − γ)u′(cc)
)
: redistribution goes in favor of the consumer
with the larger welfare-weighted marginal utility of consumption.
12
3.5 Example Let u = log. Suppose
γv′(cw0 )[f
′(k0)− δ−2ρ] + (1−γ)/k0 = 0 where cw0 := f(k0)− δk0−ρk0 > 0 & 0 < f ′(k0)− δ 6= ρ. (9)
Then the following solves (5): kt ≡ k0, r̄t ≡ ρ (hence ηt ≡ 0), cwt ≡ cw0 , and q3t ≡ γv′(cw0 ). So Lansing’s









with q30 = γv′(cw0 ). So, from (9), q1t and q2t do not converge. The tax rate on capital income is not zero:
τkt[f
′(k0)− δ] ≡ f ′(k0)− δ − ρ 6= 0.
Return now to the general case (3) when the capitalist’s utility is not necessarily u = log. As stated
in the introduction, the focus of attention is time paths for which the observables kt, cct , r̄t converge to
positive limits as t tends to infinity. Thus, for t suffi ciently large the observables are approximately time
invariant. To gain some insight we will temporarily take this approximation to the extreme: suppose that
for all t ≥ T , (kt, cct , r̄t) ≡ (k, cc, r̄). Although a time invariant path does not in general solve the optimal
taxation problem, we will use this approximate solution to derive some implications. This will shed light on
the limiting behavior as t→∞ for the true optimum which we will then analyze rigorously in theorem 3.6.
If a solution to (3) were to satisfy (kt, cct , r̄t) ≡ (k, cc, r̄) for all t ≥ T with cc > 0 and k > 0, then r̄ = ρ
from (3e) and cc = ρk from (3d). Also for all t ≥ T , cwt ≡ cw = f(k) − δk − ρk from (2); assume this is
positive. From (3a), q1t = q1T − γv′(cw)[f ′(k)− δ − ρ](t− T ) for all t ≥ T . Then from (3c) (with ηt = 0 for
all t ≥ T since r̄t = ρ), q2t = ku′′(ρk)[u′(ρk)]−1{q1T − γv′(cw)− γv′(cw)[f ′(k)− δ − ρ](t− T )} for all t ≥ T .
All that remains is (3b), which reduces to (1 − γ)u′(ρk) − q1t = ρq2t − q̇2t for all t ≥ T . With the above
solutions for q1t and q2t this requires that the coeffi cients of t match up:
γv′(cw)[f ′(k)− δ − ρ] = −ρku′′(ρk)[u′(ρk)]−1γv′(cw)[f ′(k)− δ − ρ]
hence
γv′(cw)[f ′(k)− δ − ρ][1 + ρku′′(ρk)/u′(ρk)] = 0. (10a)
It also requires (1− γ)u′(ρk)− q1T = ρq2T − q̇2T :
(1− γ)u′(ρk)− q1T = ρku′′(ρk)[u′(ρk)]−1[q1T − γv′(cw)] + ku′′(ρk)[u′(ρk)]−1γv′(cw)[f ′(k)− δ − ρ]
hence
q1T [1 + ρku
′′(ρk)/u′(ρk)] = (1− γ)u′(ρk)− ku′′(ρk)[u′(ρk)]−1γv′(cw)[f ′(k)− δ − 2ρ]. (10b)
The solution to (10a) and (10b) requires one of the following alternatives:
(i) f ′(k) = ρ+ δ and ρku′′(ρk)/u′(ρk) 6= −1;
(ii) ρku′′(ρk)/u′(ρk) = −1 and ρ(1− γ)u′(ρk) = −γv′(cw)[f ′(k)− δ − 2ρ].
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In each of these, the first condition ensures that (10a) is satisfied, while the second ensures that (10b) is
satisfied. In particular, in (i) the second condition allows us to find a unique value for q1T that satisfies (10b).
In (i), the capital tax is zero whereas in (ii), the capital tax is not restricted to be zero. Lansing’s example
with u = log is an instance of alternative (ii): the first condition in (ii) is satisfied identically and the second
condition determines the value of k. (I.e., it determines the value of k that would lead to a time invariant
path.) When u 6= log, alternative (ii) would impose two distinct restrictions on k making it unlikely to have
any solution. Thus, other than u = log, alternative (ii) can be effectively dismissed and this leaves us with
alternative (i) – zero tax on capital income.
These results for the time invariant approximate solution lead to the following theorem for the limiting
behavior of the optimality conditions (3). As stated in the introduction, this theorem assumes that the
observable macro variables converge to positive limits but it makes no assumptions about co-states.
3.6 Theorem Suppose a solution to (3) has the property that kt, cct , and r̄t converge as t tends to infinity,
with strictly positive limits for kt, cct , and c
w




′′(cct)] = 0 or
both.


















′(kt)− δ − r̄t]
u′(cct)
. (11)
Then from the mean value theorem, for all t ≥ T there exists s ∈ [T, t] such that
q1t/u
′(cct) = q1T /u
′(ccT )− (t− T )γ[u′(ccs)]−1v′(cws )[f ′(ks)− δ − r̄s]. (12)
Under the convergence hypotheses, we can choose T suffi ciently large so that [u′(ccs)]
−1v′(cws )[f
′(ks)− δ− r̄s]





′(kt) − δ − r̄t]
)








. Now consider the limiting behavior of q2t. Since limt→∞ r̄t = ρ




























′(kt)− δ − r̄t]
)
.





























′(cct)− 1 + γ].
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′(ccs)− 1 + γ]ds. (13)






l’Hopital’s rule, limt→∞[zt/e−ρt] = limt→∞[u′(cct)]
2[ρu′′(cct)]




′(cct)− 1 + γ] = −γ[u′(cct)]−1v′(cwt )[f ′(kt)− δ − r̄t].
We can now express (13) as follows after applying integration by parts to the right side:
−e−ρtq2tu′(cct)/u′′(cct) =
[









′(ks)− δ − r̄s]ds
= zt[q1t/u






′(ks)− δ − r̄s]ds.
The second line follows from the limiting behavior of zt and from q1t = O(t) as t → ∞. Use this equation











′(ks)− δ − r̄s]ds− ηt. (14)
As t tends to infinity, all terms on the right side of this equation converge. In particular, l’Hopital’s rule
can be applied to the integral divided by e−ρt, while as shown previously ηt = 0 for all t suffi ciently
large. Furthermore, the term in square brackets on the left side converges. There are two possible cases:
(i) limt→∞[kt + eρtzt/u′(cct)] 6= 0, or (ii) limt→∞[kt + eρtzt/u′(cct)] = 0. In case (i), (14) reveals that q1t











where the second equality uses limt→∞ cct = ρ limt→∞ kt from (3d), (3e), and it also uses the earlier result
regarding the limiting behavior of zt.
3.7 Remark Consider the following cases of the theorem. If u = log, then in the proof zt = −e−ρt/ρ and
cct = ρkt, so the left side of (14) is identically zero. Then dropping time subscripts to denote limiting values,
the limit of (14) multiplied by −ρ is 0 = γv′(cw)k[f ′(k)−δ−2ρ]+1−γ (apply l’Hopital’s rule to the integral
divided by e−ρt) with cw = f(k) − δk − ρk. This determines the steady state value(s) of k, and hence, by






, it also determines τk. If u is any other constant EIS function
for which the convergence hypotheses are satisfied, then cc+u′(cc)/u′′(cc) 6= 0, so the theorem yields τk = 0.
In this case, q1t converges and (14) determines its limiting value, while the equation f ′(k) = δ+ρ determines
k. For general u, if τkt fails to converge to zero, k must satisfy ρk+ u′(ρk)/u′′(ρk) = 0, and (14) determines
the limiting behavior of the indeterminate form limt→∞ q1t[kt + eρtzt/u′(cct)].
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4 Conclusion
This paper has clarified the relationship between the results of Judd (1985) and Lansing (1999). Judd’s
theorem states that in the long run, the optimal tax rate on capital income converges to zero.13 Lansing
identifies a logarithmic example of one of Judd’s models in which this tax rate can converge in the long
run to any number, zero or otherwise – the value depends on the model’s primitives (parameter values,
initial condition, worker’s utility function, production function). It seems odd that the same model can
generate two different results. The apparent contradiction is resolved by observing that Lansing has relaxed
the convergence hypotheses of Judd’s theorem. As a consequence, Lansing’s hypotheses are satisfied by a
wider range of primitives, each of which generates its own optimal time path(s) for the model’s variables, and
hence a wider range of properties is possible in steady state. One would like to know if a further relaxation
of the hypotheses, satisfied by a yet wider range of primitives, will allow for yet more possibilities for steady
state properties. Theorem 3.6 addresses this issue and finds that any interior steady state for the optimal
tax equilibrium of section 2’s model must satisfy one (or both) of the following: (i) the capital tax converges
to zero in the long run, or (ii) the elasticity of the capitalist’s marginal utility of consumption converges to
one in the long run. In (ii), the income and substitution effects of an interest rate change just cancel. This
is satisfied identically with logarithmic utility, which was the case considered by Lansing.
13Judd (1999, 2002) has returned to this issue, but not with the worker-capitalist model. The range of views on capital
income taxation is illustrated by Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (1999) on the one hand who say that it is a bad idea to tax capital
income, and on the other hand Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009) who say that taxing capital is not a bad idea. The range of
models is also vast: infinitely lived agents with uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks (e.g., Aiyagari 1995), overlapping generations
of agents with uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks (e.g., Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger 2009), government expenditure that depends
on the size of the economy (e.g., Ben-Gad 2017; Lu and Chen 2015), housing capital in addition to business capital (e.g., Eerola
and Määttänen 2013), among many others.
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Appendix
This appendix contains material on the following: the effect of interest rates on savings; when can the first
best be decentralized as an equilibrium; derivation of Lansing’s (1999) theorem from Judd’s (1985) optimality
conditions; necessary conditions for the infinite horizon optimal taxation problem; and could r̄t ≡ 0 be a
solution to the infinite horizon optimal taxation problem.
A: The effect of interest rates on savings
Consider a two period model in which a consumer chooses first period consumption c1 and second period
consumption c2 to maximize u1(c1) + βu2(c2) subject to the present value budget constraint c1 + c2/R ≤
y1 + y2/R. The per-period utility functions u1 and u2 are strictly increasing and strictly concave; β is a
subjective discount factor (which could have been subsumed in u2); R is the gross after-tax interest rate; and
yt is exogenous income in period t. Let y = y1 + y2/R be present value income. The first order conditions
are u′1(c1)/[βu
′

















































Therefore, in theorem 3.6 the condition limt→∞[cct + u
′(cct)/u
′′(cct)] = 0 has an interpretation that savings
are insensitive to the interest rate in the long run: the income effect and the substitution effect cancel each
other out.
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B: When can the first best be decentralized as an equilibrium?




e−ρt[γv(cwt ) + (1− γ)u(cct)]dt
subject to cct + c
w
t + k̇t + δkt = f(kt)
k0 > 0 given.
The current value Hamiltonian is H(k, cc, cw, λ) = γv(cw) + (1− γ)u(cc) + λ[f(k)− δk− cc − cw] where λ is
the co-state for k. The optimality conditions are
∂H/∂k = λt[f
′(kt)− δ] = ρλt − λ̇t
∂H/∂cc = (1− γ)u′(cct)− λt = 0
∂H/∂cw = γv′(cwt )− λt = 0
∂H/∂λ = f(kt)− δkt − cct − cwt = k̇t
lim
t→∞
e−ρtλtkt = 0, k0 > 0 given.
We can use the ∂H/∂cc equation to eliminate λ and get the following equivalent conditions:
ċctu
′′(cct)/u
′(cct) = ρ+ δ − f ′(kt) (15)
(1− γ)u′(cct) = γv′(cwt ) (16)
k̇t = f(kt)− δkt − cct − cwt (17)
lim
t→∞
e−ρtu′(cct)kt = 0, k0 > 0 given. (18)
Suppose we have a solution to these first best conditions, denoted by asterisks, {cc∗t , cw∗t , k∗t }t≥0. Our
task is to determine when this solution can be decentralized as an equilibrium. I.e., when can we find {r̄t}t≥0
such that {cc∗t , cw∗t , k∗t , r̄t}t≥0 is a solution to
cwt = f(kt)− δkt − r̄tkt (19)
k̇t = r̄tkt − cct (20)
ċctu
′′(cct)/u
′(cct) = ρ− r̄t (21)
lim
t→∞
e−ρtu′(cct)kt = 0, k0 > 0 given. (22)
We have omitted the constraint r̄t ≥ 0 which was imposed on the government’s optimal taxation problem.
Since the first best satisfies (15), we will satisfy (21) if and only if
r̄t := f
′(k∗t )− δ. (23)
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Since the first best satisfies (17), and with r̄t as just defined, we will satisfy (20) if and only if
cw∗t = f(k
∗
t )− k∗t f ′(k∗t ). (24)
If the first best does indeed satisfy (24), and with r̄t defined by (23), then the final equilibrium condition,
(19), is also satisfied.
We conclude that the first best can be decentralized as an equilibrium if and only if it satisfies (24) for
all t ≥ 0. There is no reason to expect it to satisfy this condition, so there is no reason to expect it to be
decentralizable. However, when this does occur, the equilibrium after-tax interest rate in (23) equals the
before-tax rate. Hence, the capital income tax rate is identically zero through all time.
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C: Derivation of Lansing’s (1999) theorem from Judd’s (1985) optimality conditions
C.1 Theorem (Lansing) Let u = log. Consider a solution to (3) with limt→∞ e−ρtu′(cct)kt = 0 and with
k0 > 0 given. Suppose kt and r̄t converge as t tends to infinity, with strictly positive limits for kt, cwt , and
f ′(kt)− δ. Then, dropping the time subscripts to denote limiting values, sgn(τk) = sgn
(
ργv′(cw)k− 1 + γ
)
.
Remark The hypotheses do not impose the convergence of any co-states. Nonetheless, q1t + ρq2t will
converge to a finite limit. See footnote 12 above.
Proof On page 9, just after the proof of theorem 3.1, we showed that when u = log the equations (3),
together with the boundary condition limt→∞ e−ρtu′(cct)kt = 0, yield both c
c
t = ρkt and also the equations (4).
Under the present convergence hypotheses, (4d) and (4e) imply r̄ = ρ. Then (4f) implies that for all t
suffi ciently large, ηt = 0. Then since k > 0, (4c) yields that for all t suffi ciently large,
−γv′(cwt ) + q1t + ρq2t = 0. (25)
Since cwt has a strictly positive limit, this tells us that q1t + ρq2t has a finite limit as t → ∞. Now take ρ
times (4b) and add it to (4a) to get
γv′(cwt )[f
′(kt)− δ − r̄t] + (1− γ)/kt + (r̄t − ρ)(q1t + ρq2t) = ρ(q1t + ρq2t)− (q̇1t + ρq̇2t).
Substitute for q1t + ρq2t from (25):
γv′(cwt )[f







for all t suffi ciently large. Loosely speaking, this equation, in which all co-states have been eliminated, is the
Euler equation for the optimal taxation problem with u = log. Since the left side of (26) has a finite limit
as t → ∞, and since the first term on the right side also has a finite limit, it follows that ddt [γv
′(cwt )] has a
finite limit, and furthermore this limit must be zero. (See footnote 9.) Let t→∞ in (26):
γv′(cw)[f ′(k)− δ − ρ] = ργv′(cw)− (1− γ)/k.
The rest of the proof is the same as theorem 3.3.
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D: Necessary conditions for the infinite horizon optimal taxation problem14




e−ρt[γv(f(kt)− δkt − r̄tkt) + (1− γ)u(cct)]dt
subject to k̇t = r̄tkt − cct
ċct = (ρ− r̄t)u′(cct)/u′′(cct)
r̄t ≥ 0
k0 > 0 given, lim
t→∞
e−ρtu′(cct)kt = 0.
Let {(r̄∗t , k∗t , cc∗t )}t≥0 be a solution to this problem. Then following Halkin (1974) we know that for all




e−ρt[γv(f(kt)− δkt − r̄tkt) + (1− γ)u(cct)]dt
subject to k̇t = r̄tkt − cct
ċct = (ρ− r̄t)u′(cct)/u′′(cct)
r̄t ≥ 0





On the last line the terminal values of the state variables are clamped down at the time T values that solve
the infinite horizon problem.15
We shall proceed to express this clamped terminal state problem in the form that appears in section 3
of chapter 2 of Fleming and Rishel (1975).16 Unfortunately we need a slight change of notation. Fleming
and Rishel (1975) use the symbol u for the control, while the optimal taxation problem already uses u for
the capitalist’s utility function. So we will replace Fleming and Rishel’s (1975) u(t) with r̄t or r̄(t) which is
the control in the main text of the paper. Also, Fleming and Rishel (1975) use the symbol f in the equation
of motion for the state of the system, while the optimal taxation problem already uses f for the production
function in intensive form. So we will replace Fleming and Rishel’s (1975) f with F .
14Necessary conditions for the finite horizon (T ) optimal taxation problem are similar. Where the derivation differs, this will
be indicated with footnotes.
15 In the finite horizon (T ) optimal taxation problem, the capitalist faces the constraint kT ≥ 0. This is the finite horizon
equivalent to the infinite horizon no-Ponzi condition. The utility maximizing capitalist chooses kT = 0. So in this case the
government’s optimal taxation problem is almost identical to the clamped terminal state problem except that the boundary
conditions are k0 > 0 given and kT = 0, with ccT unconstrained.
16Wendell H. Fleming and Raymond W. Rishel, Deterministic and Stochastic Optimal Control, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1975.
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F (t, x1, x2, x3, r̄) =
 r̄x1 − x2(ρ− r̄)u′(x2)/u′′(x2)
e−ρt[γv(f(x1)− δx1 − r̄x1) + (1− γ)u(x2)]
 .














dt. Compare this with the welfare objective in the optimal taxation
problem with clamped terminal state. If we start the system at the fixed time t0 = 0 and end it at the fixed
time t1 = T , then the performance index which we seek to minimize is the negative of welfare:
φ1
(
t0, t1, x(t0), x(t1)
)
= x3(t0)− x3(t1).
The end conditions are φ2(·) = φ3(·) = φ4(·) = φ5(·) = φ6(·) = 0 where
φ2
(





t0, t1, x(t0), x(t1)
)
= t1 − T
φ4
(










t0, t1, x(t0), x(t1)
)
= x2(t1)− cc∗T .
Since x(t0) and x(t1) are 3-tuples, φ is a function from R8 to R6. The closed control set U , introduced on
the last line of page 23 of Fleming and Rishel (1975), is taken to be U = [0,∞). This captures the constraint
r̄t ≥ 0.17
The Pontryagin necessary conditions for optimality of (x∗, r̄∗) are (5.1) through (5.6) on page 27 of
Fleming and Rishel (1975). These conditions are that there exists a non-zero vector (λ1, . . . , λ6) with λ1 ≤ 0
and there exists a function P : [t0, t1]→ R3 such that




∀ t ∈ [t0, t1] (adjoint equations)
P (t)′
[






F (t, x∗(t), r̄)
]
∀ t ∈ (t0, t1) (maximum principle)
17 In the finite horizon (T ) optimal taxation problem, we modify φ as follows: φ5
(
t0, t1, x(t0), x(t1)
)
= x1(t1) which captures













































where φx1 is the partial derivative of φ with respect to the arguments of x(t1), and similarly for φx0 . This
notation φx1 is not ideal since x1 refers to a 3-tuple here whereas x1 also refers to the first state variable, a
scalar. Below, the meaning of x1 should be clear from the context. In what follows, we drop the asterisks.
We now proceed to re-write these necessary conditions, using the optimal taxation problem’s x, F , and
φ. From the definition of F above we have that Fx(t, x1, x2, x3, r̄) is equal to r̄ −1 00 (ρ− r̄){1− [u′′(x2)]−2u′(x2)u′′′(x2)} 0
e−ρtγv′(f(x1)− δx1 − r̄x1)
[




Hence the third component of the adjoint equations yields Ṗ3(t) ≡ 0, so P3(t) is a constant which we will
simply denote P3. Then the other two adjoint equations can be written as follows, using the definition of x
and using the end conditions t0 = t1 − T = 0:
Ṗ1(t) = −P1(t)r̄t − P3e−ρtγv′(f(kt)− δkt − r̄tkt)
[
f ′(kt)− δ − r̄t
]
∀ t ∈ [0, T ] (27)









− P3e−ρt(1− γ)u′(cct) ∀ t ∈ [0, T ]. (28)












∀ t ∈ (0, T ).




P1(t)r̄kt − P2(t)r̄u′(cct)/u′′(cct) + P3e−ρtγv
(
f(kt)− δkt − r̄kt
)}
∀ t ∈ (0, T ). (29)
The first order necessary condition for this problem is
P1(t)kt − P2(t)u′(cct)/u′′(cct)− P3e−ρtγktv′
(
f(kt)− δkt − r̄tkt
)
= η̆t ≤ 0 & η̆tr̄t = 0 ∀ t ∈ (0, T ) (30)
where η̆t is a Lagrange multiplier.
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We now use the definition of φ to evaluate its derivative:18
φt0
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Substitute into the transversality conditions to get the following, where we use the result above that P3 is a
constant: (

















f(kT )− δkT − r̄T kT
)
+ (1− γ)u(ccT )
]
= −λ3









The last transversality condition is the only place where λ2 appears so this equation serves as the definition
of λ2 but plays no other role in the solution to the optimal taxation problem. Similarly, the penulti-
mate transversality condition defines λ3 but plays no other role. The other transversality conditions define
λ4 = −P1(0), λ5 = P1(T ), and λ6 = P2(T ). We also have λ1 = −P3. Recall from the statement of the Pon-
tryagin necessary conditions that λ1 ≤ 0. Thus, the transversality conditions provide us with the following
information:19
P2(0) = 0 & P3 ≥ 0.
By way of contradiction, suppose (P1(0), P3) = (0, 0). Then, together with the transversality condition
P2(0) = 0, the unique solution to the differential equations (27) and (28) is P1(t) ≡ 0 and P2(t) ≡ 0. But
then the transversality conditions yield λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = λ4 = λ5 = λ6 = 0 which is a violation of the
18 In the finite horizon (T ) optimal taxation problem, φ is a function from R8 to R5. See footnote 17. In this case the
derivative of φ would include only the first 5 rows shown here. Furthermore, the non-zero vector λ would have only 5 components,
(λ1, . . . , λ5).
19 In the finite horizon (T ) optimal taxation problem, there is no sixth component of φ and there is no λ6. See footnote 18. So
where λ6 appears in the transversality conditions in the text, it would be replaced with 0 for the finite horizon optimal taxation
problem. In this case, the transversality conditions would provide us with the following information: P2(0) = P2(T ) = 0 &
P3 ≥ 0. The necessary conditions for optimality would thus be this information together with (27), (28), and (29)/(30).
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Pontryagin necessary conditions for optimality. We conclude that the assumption (P1(0), P3) = (0, 0) leads
to a contradiction so, after a normalization, we have20
P2(0) = 0 & P3 ≥ 0 & ‖(P1(0), P3)‖ = 1. (31)
In summary, if {(r̄t, kt, cct)}t≥0 solves the infinite horizon optimal taxation problem then it also solves the
finite horizon (T ) optimal taxation problem with clamped terminal state and hence there exists a function
P : [0, T ]→ R2 and there exists a number P3 such that (27), (28), (29), (30), and (31) are satisfied.
Following Halkin (1974) we consider the finite horizon optimal taxation problem with clamped terminal
state for a sequence of time horizons T 1, T 2, . . . with limi→∞ T i = ∞. As above, for each i there exists
a function P i : [0, T i] → R2 and there exists a number P i3 such that (27), (28), (29), (30), and (31) are
satisfied when the control and state are given by the solution to the infinite horizon optimal taxation problem.




3 ) converges. For





3) = (P1(0), P3). We have P3 ≥ 0 and ‖(P1(0), P3)‖ = 1 since, by (31), these conditions are
satisfied for all i. Similarly since P i2(0) = 0 for all i, if we define P2(0) := limi→∞ P
i
2(0) then P2(0) = 0.
For t ∈ [0,∞) consider the differential equations (27), (28), and Ṗ3(t) ≡ 0 with initial conditions






3) as in the previous paragraph. It should be understood that
where the control and state appear in these equations their values are the solution to the infinite horizon
optimal taxation problem. Let P : [0,∞)→ R3 denote the solution to these differential equations with these
initial conditions. Since solutions to differential equations are continuous in initial conditions21 and since
limi→∞ T
i = ∞ we have for all t > 0, (P1(t), P2(t), P3(t)) = limi→∞(P i1(t), P i2(t), P i3). Then by continuity,
{(P1(t), P2(t))}t≥0 and P3 satisfy (29) and (30).
In summary, we have shown that if {(r̄t, kt, cct)}t≥0 solves the infinite horizon optimal taxation problem
then there exists a function P : [0,∞) → R2 and there exists a number P3 such that (27), (28), (29), (30),
and (31) are satisfied with [0, T ] replaced by [0,∞) and with (0, T ) replaced by (0,∞). That is:
Ṗ1(t) = −P1(t)r̄t − P3e−ρtγv′(f(kt)− δkt − r̄tkt)
[
f ′(kt)− δ − r̄t
]
∀ t ≥ 0 (32)









− P3e−ρt(1− γ)u′(cct) ∀ t ≥ 0 (33)
20 In the finite horizon (T ) optimal taxation problem, we have P2(0) = P2(T ) = 0 & P3 ≥ 0. See footnote 19. By way of
contradiction, if P3 = 0 the first order linear differential equations (27) and (28) with boundary conditions P2(0) = P2(T ) = 0
would yield P1(t) ≡ 0 and P2(t) ≡ 0. But then the transversality conditions would yield λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = λ4 = λ5 = 0 which
would violate the Pontryagin necessary conditions for optimality. Thus, it must be that P3 > 0.
21See section 4 of chapter 8 of Morris W. Hirsch and Stephen Smale, Differential Equations, Dynamical Systems, and Linear




P1(t)r̄kt − P2(t)r̄u′(cct)/u′′(cct) + P3e−ρtγv
(
f(kt)− δkt − r̄kt
)}
∀ t > 0 (34)
P1(t)kt − P2(t)u′(cct)/u′′(cct)− P3e−ρtγktv′
(
f(kt)− δkt − r̄tkt
)
= η̆t ≤ 0 & η̆tr̄t = 0 ∀ t > 0 (35)
P2(0) = 0 & P3 ≥ 0 & ‖(P1(0), P3)‖ = 1. (36)
We now ask if the system (32) through (36) can have a solution in which P3 = 0. If so, then P1(0) = ±1
from (36), while (32) and (33) yield
P1(t) = P1(0)e





































where the second equality uses the solution for P1(t) above. Substitute these solutions for P1(t) and P2(t),













= η̆t ≤ 0 & η̆tr̄t = 0 ∀ t > 0.
Since u′′ < 0 < u′ and since the exponential function is strictly positive, the term in curly braces is strictly
positive. Then since P1(0) = ±1 from (36), it follows that (35) requires P1(0) = −1 and r̄t = 0 for all t > 0.
In summary, the assumption P3 = 0 leads to the conclusion that the optimal control for the infinite horizon
optimal taxation problem must be r̄t = 0 for all t > 0.
The contrapositive of the result from the previous paragraph is the following: if r̄t ≡ 0 does not solve
the infinite horizon optimal taxation problem (which is addressed in appendix E), then P3 6= 0, and hence
from (36), P3 > 0.22 In this case we can let
q1t := e
ρtP1(t)/P3, q2t := e
ρtP2(t)/P3, ηt := −eρtη̆t/P3.
22 In the finite horizon (T ) optimal taxation problem, we have P3 > 0 and this holds without any need to exclude r̄t ≡ 0
from being optimal. See footnote 20. So in this case we can apply the transformation that appears below in the text and find
that (3) is necessary for optimality. But in addition, recall that for the finite horizon optimal taxation problem P2(T ) = 0. See





Ṗ1(t) = −ρP3e−ρtq1t + P3e−ρtq̇1t
P2(t) = P3e
−ρtq2t
Ṗ2(t) = −ρP3e−ρtq2t + P3e−ρtq̇2t
η̆t = −P3e−ρtηt.
Use these to substitute for P1(t), Ṗ1(t), P2(t), Ṗ2(t), and η̆t in (32), (33), (34), (35), and (36). Then divide
each of (32) through (36) by P3e−ρt > 0 to get
−ρq1t + q̇1t = −q1tr̄t − γv′(f(kt)− δkt − r̄tkt)
[
f ′(kt)− δ − r̄t
]
∀ t ≥ 0













q1tr̄kt − q2tr̄u′(cct)/u′′(cct) + γv
(
f(kt)− δkt − r̄kt
)}
∀ t > 0
q1tkt − q2tu′(cct)/u′′(cct)− γktv′
(
f(kt)− δkt − r̄tkt
)
= −ηt ≤ 0 & ηtr̄t = 0 ∀ t > 0
q20 = 0.
The first two lines of these expressions coincide with (3a) and (3b) respectively. The penultimate line
coincides with (3c) and the first part of (3f). The boundary condition q20 = 0 on the last line here appears
in (3f).
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E: Could r̄t ≡ 0 be a solution to the infinite horizon optimal taxation problem?
In section 3 we assumed the optimal time path for the after-tax net of depreciation interest rate is not r̄t ≡ 0.
By excluding r̄t ≡ 0 from consideration, we were able to use the normal Pontryagin necessary conditions for
optimality and exclude the abnormal case. However, proper analysis should not impose an assumption on
the time path {r̄t}t≥0 since it is endogenous to the optimal taxation problem. The purpose of this appendix
is to show that under assumptions 1 and 2 below, r̄t ≡ 0 is not optimal. These assumptions are stated in
terms of primitives (initial condition, parameter, production function, capitalist’s utility function) and not in
terms of endogenous variables. Where the analysis brushes over some technical details, this will be pointed
out in the presentation.




Our first result will be that if the worker’s welfare weight γ is zero, then r̄t ≡ 0 cannot be optimal. This
is obvious. The capitalist is dependent on interest income. So when all welfare weight is on the capitalist
it cannot be optimal to tax away all interest income. The more interesting scenario is γ > 0. The worker’s
equilibrium consumption is cwt = f(kt)−δkt− r̄tkt which is adversely affected in the short run by an increase
in r̄t. So if this short run effect is dominant then perhaps it could be optimal to set r̄t ≡ 0. But in the
longer run r̄t affects capital accumulation via k̇t = r̄tkt − cct and capital affects the worker’s consumption:
∂cwt /∂kt = f
′(kt)− δ − r̄t. In particular, relative to the r̄t ≡ 0 equilibrium, an increase in the capital stock
is desirable for the worker if f ′(kt)− δ > 0. Thus, relative to the r̄t ≡ 0 equilibrium, if (i) an increase in r̄t
causes an increase in capital and if (ii) f ′(kt) − δ > 0, then apparently the worker’s longer run utility will
improve if we increase r̄t above zero. If this longer run effect is dominant then it would seem r̄t ≡ 0 is not
optimal. This is indeed correct when conditions (i) and (ii) are formalized as assumptions 1 and 2 below.
We now turn to the analysis.
Let T ≥ 0 be given and let ε ≥ 0 be given. Consider the following time path:
r̄t =
{
0 if 0 ≤ t ≤ T
ε if T < t.
All results in this appendix are based on this family of variations, parametrized by T and ε. Note that ε = 0
yields r̄t ≡ 0, the object of study here. If, within this family of variations, ε = 0 is not optimal for the
optimal taxation problem, then surely r̄t ≡ 0 does not solve the optimal taxation problem more generally.






0 if 0 ≤ t ≤ T
ε(t− T ) if T < t.
The equilibrium is as follows. The solution to the capitalist’s utility maximization problem is given
by (1): e−ρtu′(cct)/u
′(cc0) = e
−R̄t and k0 =
∫∞
0
e−R̄sccsds. The worker’s consumption is given by (2):
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cwt = f(kt) − δkt − r̄tkt. The capital accumulation equation is k̇t = r̄tkt − cct which is equivalent to
e−R̄tkt − k0 = −
∫ t
0
e−R̄sccsds. With r̄t and R̄t as above, we have
u′(cct) =
{
eρtu′(cc0) if 0 ≤ t ≤ T
eρt−ε(t−T )u′(cc0) if T < t
kt = k0 −
∫ t
0
ccsds if 0 ≤ t ≤ T
















f(kt)− δkt if 0 ≤ t ≤ T
f(kt)− δkt − εkt if T < t.
Social welfare is W (ε, T ) :=
∫∞
0
e−ρt[γv(cwt ) + (1−γ)u(cct)]dt where the consumption levels are evaluated
at the (ε, T ) equilibrium. The government faces the policy constraint r̄t ≥ 0. Thus if there exists T such that
Wε(0, T ) > 0, then r̄t ≡ 0 cannot solve the optimal taxation problem. Our goal for the remainder of this
appendix is to evaluate the partial derivative Wε(0, T ) and show that it is positive for suffi ciently large T
when assumptions 1 and 2 below are satisfied. We do not use the Laplace transform method of Judd (1985)
since the baseline ε = 0 equilibrium is not in steady state.
Assuming we can differentiate under the integral sign and all integrals converge, Wε is given by































where the second line uses the capitalist’s first order condition as presented above.
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We now proceed to differentiate each of the equilibrium equations with respect to ε. We again assume







∂ε if 0 ≤ t ≤ T
eρt−ε(t−T )
[


















ds if 0 ≤ t ≤ T
e−ε(t−T )
[



















































[f ′(kt)− δ] ∂kt∂ε if 0 ≤ t ≤ T
−kt + [f ′(kt)− δ − ε] ∂kt∂ε if T < t.
Throughout, we can use the capitalist’s first order condition to replace eρt with u′(cct)/u
′(cc0) if 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
and replace eρt−ε(t−T ) with u′(cct)/u
′(cc0) if T < t. We will also combine the integrals that have s − T as a










′(cc0) if 0 ≤ t ≤ T
u′(cct)
[



















ds if 0 ≤ t ≤ T
e−ε(t−T )
[



























































[f ′(kt)− δ] ∂kt∂ε if 0 ≤ t ≤ T
−kt + [f ′(kt)− δ − ε] ∂kt∂ε if T < t.
Since the goal is to determine the sign ofWε(ε, T ) at ε = 0, we now evaluate these equilibrium derivatives


















whether t is finite or infinite. Furthermore, with ε = 0 the capitalist’s consumption Euler equation (3e) can





ds = cct − cc0. And for the t → ∞ version of this, note that with ε = 0
the capitalist’s first order condition is u′(cct) = e
ρtu′(cc0), which implies limt→∞ c
c
t = 0, hence our integrated





ds = −cc0. So we will now evaluate the equilibrium derivatives at



















′(cc0) if 0 ≤ t ≤ T
u′(cct)
[







if T < t
∂kt







(cct − cc0)/ρ if 0 ≤ t ≤ T
∂kt


























[f ′(kt)− δ] ∂kt∂ε |ε=0 if 0 ≤ t ≤ T
−kt + [f ′(kt)− δ] ∂kt∂ε |ε=0 if T < t











(s− T ) [ccs + u′(ccs)/u′′(ccs)] ds. (38)
Note that if u = log we have c+ u′(c)/u′′(c) ≡ 0, so ∂cc0/∂ε = 0 since u = log implies cc0 = ρk0 regardless of
the time path for {r̄t}t≥0.
We now evaluate Wε in (37) at ε = 0 and substitute for (∂cwt /∂ε)|ε=0 and for (∂cct/∂ε)|ε=0 using the
results above:





















































−cc0/ρ when ε = 0. For now, we leave the other line as it is:
















(t− T )cctdt. (39)
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This gives a first result which, as mentioned in the introductory remarks to this appendix, is intuitively
obvious:
• If the worker’s welfare weight is zero, i.e., γ = 0, then Wε(0, T ) > 0 for all T and so r̄t ≡ 0 cannot
solve the optimal taxation problem.
We now consider γ > 0. Use the equilibrium derivatives to substitute for (∂kt/∂ε)|ε=0 in formula (39)
for Wε(0, T ):






































(t− T )cctdt. (40)
For the remainder of this appendix we make two assumptions:
• Assumption 1 Either the capitalist’s utility function is u = log, or else limc→0 cu′′(c)/u′(c) ∈ (−1, 0).
For the latter alternative, the assumption is that this limit exists and is strictly between −1 and
zero. This is satisfied by, among many others, u(c) = (c1−1/σ − 1)/(1 − 1/σ) with the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution σ > 1.
If u = log we have c + u′(c)/u′′(c) ≡ 0, so not only does (38) yield (∂cc0/∂ε)|ε=0 = 0 thereby causing
the first line of (40) to equal zero, but also the third line of (40) equals zero too. Alternatively, if
limc→0 cu
′′(c)/u′(c) ∈ (−1, 0) then c + u′(c)/u′′(c) < 0 for all c suffi ciently small. We will show that
this implies that the sum of the first and third lines of (40) is positive if T is suffi ciently large. Note,
from appendix A, savings (and hence capital) are an increasing function of the interest rate if future
consumption satisfies c + u′(c)/u′′(c) < 0. In effect, we are assuming that an increase in r̄t causes an
increase in capital.
• Assumption 2 The initial stock of capital satisfies f ′(k0)− δ ≥ 0.
That is, at the beginning of time the pre-tax net of depreciation interest rate is not negative. It then
increases monotonically as time evolves since, with ε = 0, capital’s law of motion is k̇t = −cct so capital
declines monotonically and its marginal product rises monotonically. Assumption 2 is stronger than
section 3’s f(k0)− δk0 > 0.
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We now consider limc→0 cu′′(c)/u′(c) ∈ (−1, 0) from assumption 1, and hence c+u′(c)/u′′(c) < 0 for all c
suffi ciently small. We shall show that the sum of the first and third lines of (40) is positive if T is suffi ciently
large. With ε = 0 the capitalist’s first order condition is eρsu′(cc0) = u
′(ccs), which implies lims→∞ c
c
s = 0.
Thus under assumption 1 there exists T1 such that if s ≥ T1 then ccs + u′(ccs)/u′′(ccs) < 0. Let T ≥ T1 and
write the sum of the first and third lines of (40) as follows, where we use (38) to substitute for (∂cc0/∂ε)|ε=0:




















(s− T ) [ccs + u′(ccs)/u′′(ccs)] ds∫∞
T





The symbol × at the end of the second line of (41) denotes multiplication. Note that the integral on
the second line of (41) also appears in the denominator on the fourth line. Since T ≥ T1, everywhere that
ccs+u
′(ccs)/u
′′(ccs) appears in (41), it is strictly negative. And under assumption 2, everywhere that f
′(kt)−δ
appears in (41), it is strictly positive. With ε = 0 the capitalist’s first order condition is u′(cct) = e
ρtu′(cc0)
which implies cct < c
c
0 for all t > 0 so the third line of (41) is strictly negative and does not depend on T . On
the fourth line of (41), the ratio of integrals has a value of zero when the dummy variable t equals T and the
value of this ratio increases monotonically as a function of t towards a limit of one as t→∞, and this holds
regardless of the value of T . Therefore, the fourth line of (41) converges to zero as T → ∞. In particular,
there exists T2 ≥ T1 such that if T ≥ T2 then the entire expression in curly braces in (41) is strictly negative.
Since the integral on the second line of (41) is strictly negative, we conclude that the entirety of (41) is
strictly positive for all T ≥ T2.
Thus far we have shown that under assumptions 1 and 2 the sum of the first, third, and fifth lines of (40)
is positive if T ≥ T2 (where we can define T2 := 0 under the u = log alternative in assumption 1). We now
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address the second and fourth lines.

















































On the fourth and fifth lines of (42) the integrand is the same but the limits of integration differ. We need
to define the integration limit S(T ). The term in square brackets, namely
(
f ′(ks+T )− δ
)
s− 1, has a value
of negative one when s = 0 and under our assumptions it increases monotonically as a function of s towards
a limit of infinity as s→∞. (Recall that when ε = 0, k̇t = −cct < 0.) Therefore there exists a unique s > 0,
denoted S(T ), such that
(
f ′(kS(T )+T ) − δ
)
S(T ) − 1 = 0. As a consequence of this definition for S(T ), the
fourth line of (42) is strictly negative since the dummy variable satisfies s ≤ S(T ) and the fifth line is strictly
positive. Furthermore, by implicit differentiation we have
S′(T ) =
−S(T )f ′′(kS(T )+T )k̇S(T )+T
f ′(kS(T )+T )− δ + S(T )f ′′(kS(T )+T )k̇S(T )+T
< 0.
We can show that limT→∞ S(T ) = 0: Since S(T ) > 0, we have limT→∞ kS(T )+T = 0 from the capitalist’s
no-Ponzi condition when ε = 0, and hence limT→∞[f ′(kS(T )+T )− δ] =∞. The result limT→∞ S(T ) = 0 now
follows from the equation
(
f ′(kS(T )+T )− δ
)










f(kS(T )+T )− δkS(T )+T
) < 1 for all s ∈ [0, S(T )) (43)
where we have used the following: cwt = f(kt) − δkt when ε = 0; f ′(kt) − δ > 0 under assumption 2; and
k̇t < 0 when ε = 0. Thus the integrand on the fourth line of (42) has an absolute value less than one. (From
the definition of S(T ), the term in square brackets in the integrand has a value between negative one and
zero.) Noting the range of integration, we conclude that the fourth line of (42) is negative with an absolute
value less than S(T ).
In preparation for analysis of the fifth line of (42), note that with ε = 0, l’Hopital’s rule and the equilibrium






















and by assumption this limit exists and is strictly positive. Since we also have limT→∞ S(T ) = 0, it follows
that there exists T3 ≥ T2 such that if T ≥ T3 then kT /ccT > S(T ). Now consider the fifth line of (42) with


























































































T − S(T )
)3
6S(T )kT /ccT
where the last line follows from direct calculation of the integral. Since limT→∞ S(T ) = 0 and since
limT→∞ kT /c
c
T is strictly positive by (44), we conclude that the fifth line of (42) tends to infinity as T →∞.
Combine this current result with our previous result that the fourth line of (42) is negative with an
absolute value less than S(T ). Thus there exists T4 ≥ T3 such that if T ≥ T4 then the entire expression
in (42) is strictly positive. That is, the sum of the second and fourth lines of (40) is strictly positive.
Previously we showed that the sum of the first, third, and fifth lines of (40) is positive if T ≥ T2. This
brings us to the final conclusion of this appendix: Under assumptions 1 and 2, if T ≥ T4 then the entire
expression in (40) is strictly positive, i.e., Wε(0, T ) > 0 and so ε = 0 cannot be optimal for the optimal
taxation problem, and more generally, r̄t ≡ 0 cannot be optimal for the optimal taxation problem.
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